@Nick | OneThingWell.dev but they have per-device preshared keys if you drop your phone in the toilet and get a new one, all your old messages are gone and you're TOFUing new keys
if I were upset, I would have expanded my blocklist without saying a word.
I am merely annoyed.
please attempt to comprehend the following:
popping out of the digital undergrowth unbidden and saying, effectively, "ah but you're incorrect and here's several reasons why" to strangers comes across as - at minimum - extremely rude and thoughtless.
@Nick | OneThingWell.dev so when I pop on to my work laptop I need to grab my zero knowledge backup creds and pull them from cold storage to read the message "Hey, can you grab cheese on your way home"?
@Nick | OneThingWell.dev I refuse to use the decrepit and broken Matrix protocol. I use XMPP+OMEMO quite regularely. I don't use proton mail, I do mail myself.
How do you backup keys? Do you just huck them on an unencrypted Samba share? Managing keys is a thorny issue, and I don't want to do that for low end and low importance messages. Threat modelling matters.
@Nick | OneThingWell.dev @Ji Fu @Alexis so you value accessibility that much less than confidentiality? You'd rather lose all your messages whenever you made a single error?
@Nick | OneThingWell.dev @Ji Fu Ok, so you don't want E2E encryption, you want... what? S2S? If you want S2S why the concern about DB dumps, since a DB dump will reveal the key?
For key management, I guess you need to do *more* key management, every single thing I work with has its own keyflow and backup strategy, and needing to do that for another things sucks, and is an onboarding burden for a new device, and why should that be default.
*Also* if you don't trust your admin, why would you trust your admin to do the encryption they said they would?
Fundamentally I am.unsure how your threat model works, and what the attacker model is, and how you balance it within the CIA Triad.
@Nick | OneThingWell.dev @Ji Fu well, optional means both sides need encryption to be turned on to get a benefit, so sure, but use signal
As for DB dumps not revealing keys, how do you envision them stored. Cryptography doesn't exist without key management, and it's *hard*. And thus network isn't designed for it, so LARPing crypto is way.more dangerous
@Nick | OneThingWell.dev @Ji Fu I... don't understand the value of this really - right? This feels like it strongly values an attack by an ephemeral attacker? I guess?
Alexis
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Luna Dragofelis ΘΔ and silverwizard like this.
Rosalina Saige :blobCatBounce::PCCFlower:
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silverwizard
in reply to Rosalina Saige :blobCatBounce::PCCFlower: • •furicle
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silverwizard
Unknown parent • •silverwizard
Unknown parent • •if you drop your phone in the toilet and get a new one, all your old messages are gone and you're TOFUing new keys
Alexis
Unknown parent • • •Alexis
Unknown parent • • •@unixroot buddy,
pal,
fellow traveler on this wet ball of gas and rock,
if I were upset, I would have expanded my blocklist without saying a word.
I am merely annoyed.
please attempt to comprehend the following:
popping out of the digital undergrowth unbidden and saying, effectively, "ah but you're incorrect and here's several reasons why" to strangers comes across as - at minimum - extremely rude and thoughtless.
silverwizard
Unknown parent • •silverwizard
Unknown parent • •@Nick | OneThingWell.dev I refuse to use the decrepit and broken Matrix protocol. I use XMPP+OMEMO quite regularely. I don't use proton mail, I do mail myself.
How do you backup keys? Do you just huck them on an unencrypted Samba share? Managing keys is a thorny issue, and I don't want to do that for low end and low importance messages. Threat modelling matters.
4223 likes this.
silverwizard
Unknown parent • •silverwizard
Unknown parent • •@Ji Fu I use Delta Chat quite heavily and love it!
And yes, people get annoyed when I tell them my email is [theircompany]@convenient.email ;)
silverwizard
Unknown parent • •silverwizard
Unknown parent • •silverwizard
Unknown parent • •@Nick | OneThingWell.dev @Ji Fu Ok, so you don't want E2E encryption, you want... what? S2S? If you want S2S why the concern about DB dumps, since a DB dump will reveal the key?
For key management, I guess you need to do *more* key management, every single thing I work with has its own keyflow and backup strategy, and needing to do that for another things sucks, and is an onboarding burden for a new device, and why should that be default.
*Also* if you don't trust your admin, why would you trust your admin to do the encryption they said they would?
Fundamentally I am.unsure how your threat model works, and what the attacker model is, and how you balance it within the CIA Triad.
Frost, Wolffucker 🐺:therian:
in reply to silverwizard • • •silverwizard likes this.
silverwizard
in reply to Frost, Wolffucker 🐺:therian: • •silverwizard
Unknown parent • •@Nick | OneThingWell.dev @Ji Fu well, optional means both sides need encryption to be turned on to get a benefit, so sure, but use signal
As for DB dumps not revealing keys, how do you envision them stored. Cryptography doesn't exist without key management, and it's *hard*. And thus network isn't designed for it, so LARPing crypto is way.more dangerous
silverwizard
Unknown parent • •